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NECROMANCING THE EQUAL RIGHTS
AMENDMENT
Brannon P. Denning*
John R. Vile**

I

In 1972, fifty years after an earlier version was first introduced, both houses of Congress approved the Equal Rights
Amendment (ERA) by the necessary two-thirds vote, and, in accordance with the Constitution's amendment procedure, sent it
to state legislatures, where three-fourths of them would have to
ratify it before it could become the law of the land. 1 As had
been the contemporary practice, Congress prescribed a sevenyear deadline for ratification. The initial prognosis for the ERA
was good: of the thirty-two state legislatures that were in session
in 1972, over twenty ratified the amendment. 2 But ratifications
soon slowed to a trickle, due in part to social conservatives' deft
exploitation of public fears about changes that would be wrought
by an ERA in the hands of an activist judiciary. 3 By 1979, the

Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale. B.A.,
The University of the South, I 992; J.D., The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, I 995;
LL.M., Yale Law School, 1999. Thanks to Alii Denning, Maria Frankowska, Pat Kelley,
Ted Kionka, Nick McCall, and Glenn Reynolds for thoughtful comments on an earlier
version of this paper.
•• Chair of the Political Science Department at Middle Tcnm:ssee State University. Ph.D., The University of Virginia; B.A., The College of William & Mary. Author of
the Encyclopedia of Constitucional Amendments, Proposed Amendments, and Amending
Issues, I789-I995 (ABC-CLIO, 1996).
I. Sec generally Equal Rig/us Amendme/ll, in John R. Vile, Encyclopedia of Constitutional Amendmems, Proposed Amendments, and Amending Issues, I789-I995 at 11921 (ABC-Clio, 1996); see also David E. Kyvig, Explicit and Authentic Acts: Amending the
U.S. Constitution I776-1995 at 394-419 (U. Press of Kansas, 1996).
2. Sec Equal Rights Amendmem, in Vile, Encyclopedia of Constitutional Amendments at 120 (cited in note I); sec also Kyvig, Amending the U.S. Constitution at 408
(cited in note 1).
3. For a description of the campaign mounted against the ERA by conservative
activist Phyllis Schlally, and aided by Senator Sam Ervin, sec Kyvig, Amending the U.S.
Constitution at 409-11 (cited in note !).
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original deadline, only thirty-five of the requisite thirty-eight
states had ratified.
Three states shy of ratification, ERA proponents persuaded
Congress to extend the deadline for ratification until 1982. 4 By
then, however, even ardent supporters were exhausted, while
ERA opponents were just warming to the fight. To make matters worse for supporters, five states rescinded their earlier ratifications5 (though Kentucky's acting governor purported to veto
its legislature's vote to rescind). Before the validity of those rescissions could be hashed out in the courts, however, the new
deadline passed and ERA's opponents declared victory. Its proponents, meanwhile, were left to advance women's rights using
the Equal Protection Clause and the Civil Rights Act's prohibition of sex discrimination.
Now, however, because of an extraordinary series of events
that resulted in the irregular ratification of the Twenty-Seventh
Amendment 6 (also known as the "Madison Amendment") 200
years after it was first proposed, ERA proponents are hoping to
reanimate the ERA for the proverbial charmed third time. 7 We
argue here that the Madison Amendment's precedential value
for the ERA is slight at best, and that, in any event, given the

4. On the congressional decision to extend the time limit by a simple majority
vote. sec Kyvig, Amending rhe U.S. Consrirurion at 415 (cited in note 1).
5. !d. at 414. For contemporaneous comment on the propriety of the extension,
sec Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Rarificarion of rhe Equal Righrs Amendmem: A Quesrion of
Time, 57 Tex. L. Rev. 919 (1979); Grover Rces III, Throwing Away rhe Key: The Unconsrirurionaliry ofrhe Equal Righrs Amendmenl Exrension, 58 Tex. L. Rev. 875 (1980). Before the expiration of the extension, one district court held that the extension was void.
Sec Idaho v. Freeman, 529 F. Supp. 1107 (D. Idaho 1981 ). Once the extension had
passed without the ERA obtaining the requisite number of states for ratification, however, the U.S. Supreme Court pronounced the case moot and ordered the district court to
dismiss it. See Narional Org. Women v. Idaho, 459 U.S. 809 (1982). For a succinct analysis of the various legal issues surrounding the ERA the first time around, sec Laurence
H. Tribe, 1 American Consrirurional Law§ 1-19 at 102-03 n.48 (Foundation Press, 3d cd.
2000).
6. U.S. Const., Amend. XXVII (''No law, varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect until an election of Representatives shall have intervened.").
7. Sec, e.g., Allison L. Held, Sheryl L. Herndon and Daniclle M. Stager, The
Equal Rig/us Amendmenr.· Why rhe ERA Remains Legally Viable and Properly Before the
Srares, 3 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 113 (1997); Debra Baker, The Fighr Ain't Over, 85
A.B.A. J. 52 (1999); Editorial, An Old Idea is New Again, St. Louis Post-Dispatch B6
(March 8, 2000); Ellen Goodman, Equal Rig/us Amendmem is Not Dead Yet, New Orleans Times-Picayune B5 (Feb. 21, 2000); Laura Scott, Another Go-Round for ERA, K,C.
Star B7 (Feb. 17, 2000); Dru Sefton, Supporrers Work to Revive ERA, USA Today 3A
(Oct. 22, 1999); Stephanie Simon, Activists Seek to Bring ERA Back to Life, L.A. Times
AS (Mar. 9. 2000).
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subsequent history of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, supporters of the ERA will not want to follow that precedent.
II
Originally proposed as one of James Madison's original
twelve amendments, 8 ten of which became our Bill of Rights, the
Madison Amendment provided that changes in congressional
pay would not take effect until an election had occurred. When
proposed in 1791, this amendment initially gained the assent of
only six states; four short of the number needed to ratify (a
number that increased as other states joined the Union). 9 In the
1870s, when Congress retroactively increased members' salaries
to $2,500 a year, Ohio ratified the amendment in protest. In
1978, after decades of rising congressional salaries, Wyoming
added its ratification, bringing the number to eight. 10
In 1982, Gregory Watson, a student at the University of
Texas at Austin, wrote a term paper in which he argued that the
amendment could still be ratified. Although he received only a
C for his efforts, 11 he launched a low-keX crusade that mustered
thirty-two additional state ratifications. 2 In 1992, the national
archivist in charge of keeping a tally certified that the amendment had been ratified; and in an election year marked by unprecedented public hostility towards Congress, both houses ratified the certification by lopsided votes- 99 to 0 in the Senate,
and 414 to 3 in the House. 1
III
The ratification of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment has,
not surprisingly, given ERA supporters renewed hope. And why
not? Proponents can hardly be faulted for asking why the passage of twenty-eight years should pose a barrier to ratification of
8. Sec generally Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rig/us: Creation and Reconstruction 8-19 (Yale U. Press, 1998) (discussing Madison's amendments not originally adopted
as part of the Bill of Rights).
9. See Twenty-Seventh Amendment, in Vile, Encyclopedia of Constitutional
Amendments at 323 (cited in note 1); see also Kyvig, Amending the U.S. Constitution at
461-70 (cited in note 1).
10. Vile, Encyclopedia ofConstitwional Amendments at 324 (cited in note 1).
II. Watson's "C" and his subsequent success led one judge to quip, "One wonders
what a student of Watson's professor would need to do to get an 'A'." Shaffer v. Clinton,
54 F. Supp. 2d 1014,1016 n.l (D. Colo. 1999).
12. Vile, Encyclopedia of Constitutional Amendments at 324 (cited in note 1 ).
13. !d.
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the ERA when it took 203 years to ratify the Twenty-Seventh
Amendment. 14 But the advocates of this belated ratification
overlook at least three important distinctions between the ERA
and the Twenty-Seventh Amendment.
First, no time limit accompanied the Twenty-Seventh
Amendment; the Equal Rights Amendment, by contrast, has exhausted not one, but two such limits. Many in 1979 questioned
the propriety of extending the first deadline at all, much less by
majority vote instead of the two-thirds congressional superma-

14. Professor Tribe wrote that the ratification of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment
··refocused scholarly attention on whether there exist any constitutional limits on the
amount of time that may pass between proposal and ratification of an amendment"'drolly adding that ''[i]f there are to be any such limits, it would seem that the more than
two-century span represented by the Twenty-seventh Amendment would implicate
them." Tribe, I American ConstiiUtional Law at 102 (cited in note 5) (footnote omitted).
Professor Tribe's concern is not an academic one. If, in fact, the ratification of the
Twenty-Seventh Amendment means that no limits exist, then there arc sleeper amendments that could become part of the Constitution. Sec infra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. Though a careful analysis of the various schools of thought is beyond the scope
of this essay, there arc two main approaches to the issue -the "formalist" model and the
"contemporaneous consensus" model.
Walter Dellinger has argued that the legitimacy of constitutional amendments
should be ensured by a formalistic application of rules by the judiciary. See Walter
Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethinking the Amendment Process,
97 Harv. L. Rev. 386, 432 (1983) ("article V should be viewed as a set of formal rules
rather than as the embodiment of vague policy objectives"). The "contemporaneous
consensus" model, endorsed by a plurality of the Court in Dillon v. Gloss, in contrast,
argues that to be truly effective, ratification "must be sufficiently contemporaneous in
[the three-fourths majority required by Article V] to reflect the will of the people in all
sections at relatively the same period, which ... ratification scattered through a long series of vears would not do." Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368,375 (1921).
Then the question arises, "Who decides?" Professor Dellinger urged, contra Dillon,
that the Supreme Court should exercise jurisdiction over such questions. See Dellinger,
supra. Laurence Tribe, in response, weighed in on the side of judicial abstention, and argued that Congress should have pride of place in amendment controversies since "[t]he
resort to amendment- to constitutional politics as opposed to constitutional law-should
be taken as a sign that the legal system has come to a point of discontinuity, a point at
which something less radical than revolution but distinctly more radical than ordinary
legal evolution is called for." Laurence H. Tribe, A Constitution We Are Amending: In
Defense of a Restrained Judicial Role, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 433, 436 (1983) (footnote omitted).
The case of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment seems to demonstrate the weaknesses
of both approaches. Under the "rules" of Article V, Congress did the correct thing by
certifying the amendment, since it contained no time limit on its ratification and the requisite number of states ratified it. But the fact that such an approach carries with it the
possibility, which bore fruit in the case of the Madison Amendment, that amendments
never die, would suggest that formalism can be pernicious-despite the fact that Professor Dellinger himself thought that the doctrine of desuetude prevented the Amendment
from being revived. On the other hand, the haste with which Congress certified the
Twenty-Seventh Amendment, suggests that it might not entirely take seriously its responsibility as rderce in those controversies. Sec also John R. Vile, Judicial Review of
the Amending Process: The Dellinger- Tribe Debate, 3 J.L. & Pol. 21 (1986).
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jority required to propose amendments. (Proponents defended
the decision to extend the deadline on the ground that the original time limit was placed in the amendment's authorizing resolution; not in the text of the amendment itself, where it would be
self-enforcing.) If the first extension was like adding an extra
quarter to benefit the losing team in a football game, allowing
ratification efforts to resume twenty years after ERA's apparent
defeat is like authorizing the losing team to continue a game after the winning team has left the stadium.
Second, unlike the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, which unquestionably got more popular with age, 15 at least five states attempted to rescind their initial ratification of the ERA, some in
response to the extension of the initial time limit. 16 Were additional states to ratify an allegedly revived ERA, a question
would immediately arise whether those rescissions were valid.
While pundits debated whether three or eight additional states
were needed to ratify, more states would likely attempt to rescind (though in a post-Ally McBeal world it is difficult to imagine that the prospect of unisex bathrooms-a favorite bugaboo
of ERA's opponents-would be as effective as a scare tactic this
time around). 17 State second-guessing of the ERA belies any notion that public opinion has been ineluctably moving in favor of
ratification.
The third point is related to the first two. The ERA was
proposed with great fanfare and was vigorously debated by both
sides. Proponents had two shots to make their case. For a vari15. See Kyvig, Amending 1/ze U.S. Cons1iuaion at 466 (cited in note 1) ("Resentment of federal government spending and the allure of a simple means of chastising the
people immediately responsible fueled growing interest in Madison's long-dormant proposal. As support in Congress for the balanced budget amendment began to wane, state
legislative enthusiasm for the congressional pay raise amendment accelerated.").
16. Simon, L.A. Times at AS (cited in note 7) ("Five states that ratified the ERA in
the '70s later passed resolutions taking it back.").
17. Though Held, Herndon, and Stager argue that rescissions arc not valid, they do
not really explore the arguments for and against, but rather note that it is the subject of
debate among scholars. Sec Held, Herndon and Stager, 3 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L.
at 131-34 (cited in note 7). Professor Tribe, who served as counsel for the National Organization of Women in their appeal from the decision of an Idaho district court upholding the validity of its rescission, argues that "the better view ... is that the weight to be
given to a state's purported rescission of a prior ratification is a political question inseparable from other nonjusticiablc aspects of Congress' supervision of the ratification process." Tribe, I American Consliuaional Law at 103 n.48 (cited in note 5). For further discussion of this issue, sec Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Anicle V: The
Cons£i£Uiional Lessons of 1/ze Twemy-Sevemh Amendmem, 103 Yale L.J. 677, 725-26
(1993) (arguing that rescissions are permitted until "the magic number of state ratifications occurs"). Sec generally John R. Vile, Permiuing Slates 10 Rescind Ralificmions of
Pending Amendmems 10 1he U.S. Cons£i£Uiion, 20 Publius: J. Federalism 109 (1990).
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ety of reasons, includinf judicial victories that seemed to render
the ERA superfluous, 1 they fell short. To allow a third bite at
the apple for the ERA would suggest that no amendment to the
U.S. Constitution ever proposed-including the amendment that
some right-wingers think strips lawyers of their citizenship and
whose ratification in the early nineteenth century was, they argue, illegally nullified 19 -could ever be regarded as rejected.
While the amendment process set forth in Article V of the Constitution was intended to be arduous, it was not intended to be
eterna/. 20
IV

Even if the Twenty-Seventh Amendment did set a precedent, those hoping that Fortune will likewise smile on the ERA's
third bid for ratification should stop to consider what sort of
precedent was set. Let's assume that the requisite number of
states could be persuaded to ratify. Let's further assume that in
an election year, members of Congress could be bullied into approving certification of the ERA, lest they be tagged as "not getting it." The question remains, "Then what?" If the ERA's
model for extraordinary ratification is the Twenty-Seventh
Amendment, the answer is "Nothing." No doubt in part because
of the Amendment's suspect pedigree, the courts and most members of Congress have tended to treat the Twenty-Seventh as a
"demi-amendment," lacking the full authority of the twenty-six
that preceded it. 21
18. Sc.:, for example, United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,524 (1996) (requiring
an "exceedingly p.:rsuasive justification" for gender-based governmental action); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (sustaining an equal protection challenge to federal law allowing male members "automatic dependency allowance" for wives, but requiring wives to prove dependency of husbands); Baker, 85 A.B.A. 1. at 54-55 (cited in
note 7) (describing the gains made by women in the judiciary).
19. The argument is made in David M. Dodge, The Missing Thirteenth Amendment,
available at <http://www.nidlink.com/-bobhard/orig13th.html> (last visited on Oct. 16,
2000). For an analysis of this case of the "missing amendment," see generally, Jol A. Silversmith, The "Missing Thirteenth Amendment": Constitutional Nonsense and Titles of
Nobility, 8 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 577 (1999). For a rebuttal (of sorts), sec generally, Richard C. Green, The Demon of Discord: Ratification and Suppression of the Original Thirteenth Article of Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, available at
<http://www.nidlink.com/-bobhard/orig13thn:ality.htmb (last visited on Oct. 16, 2000).
For other amendments that could be revived, sec Paulsen, 103 Yale L.J. at 701-04 (cited
in note 17).
20. Quite the contrary. James Madison caution.:d his fellow citizens not to resort
too frequently to the amending process. Sec Brannon P. Denning, Means to Amend:
Theories of Constitutional Change, 65 Tenn. L. Rev. 155, 169-72 (1997).
21. There arc three reported cases that discuss the Twenty-Seventh Amendment.
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The only Court of Appeals decision interpreting the
Twenty-Seventh Amendment turned back a congressman's 22
challenge to annual cost-of-living increases (COLAs) automatically given to members of Congress as part of the 1989 Ethics
Reform Act. 23 According to the court's reasoning, the automatic
increases are not "law[s] varying the compensation" of members
of Congress. 24 Instead, the original act that provided for the annual adjustments was the law; and-assuming as the court did
that the Twenty-Seventh Amendment applies to laws passed before its ratification- "the COLA provision of the Ethics Reform
Act of 1989 is constitutional because it did not cause any adjustment to congressional compensation until after the election of
1990 and the seating of the new Congress." 25 While this may be
a plausible textual argument, the construction given by the Court
certainly blinks at the apparent purpose of the Amendment. 26 A
jury-rigged ratification of the ERA might result in its similar
evisceration by the judiciary that will be called upon to interpret
it.27
Sec generally Boehner v. Anderson, 30 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Shaffer v. Clinton, 54 F.
Supp. 2d 1014 (D. Colo. 1999); Boehner v. Anderson, 809 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1992).
22. Because federal courts will not hear "generalized grievances," or suits in which
a plaintiffs harm (here, congressional violation of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment), is
shared by millions of citizens, members of Congress appear to be the only ones possessed
of the requisite "standing" to challenge the cost-of-living increases for itself in court.
Sec, for example, Shaffer, 54 F. Supp. 2d at 1016-24 (denying standing to taxpayers and to
state legislator who voted to ratify Twenty-Seventh Amendment; invoking a variety of
other procedural doctrines including venue and ripeness to avoid decision on the merits
of claim challenging constitutionality of COLAs). On standing generally, sec Erwin
Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 55-92 (Aspen, 1997).
23. Boehner, 30 F.3d at 161.
24. !d. at 161-62.
25. !d. at 162.
26. Though the court held that the 1989 Act was the "law" that authorized the annual COLAs, one might argue that each COLA is a separate appropriation that the Constitution requires to be made "by law." Sec U.S. Cons!., Art. I,§ 9, cl. 7 ("No Money
shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by
Law .... "). At any rate, the court provides no answer to the argument that allowing a
congress prospectively to raise tht: salaries of future congresses in perpetuity (all of
whom can thereafter disclaim responsibility for the salary increases) essentially guts the
Twenty-Seventh Amendment.
27. Judge Sporkin's district court opinion in Boehner v. Anderson heaps scorn on
the idea that the Twenty-Sevt:nth Amendment in any way affected the validity of the
COLAs and the Ethics Reform Act of 1989. St:e Boehner, 809 F. Supp. at 140. Instead,
Sporkin faulted tht: Founding Fathers for "not spell[ing] out with sufficit:nt clarity how
important it was to pay our government leadt:rs a decent and adequate compensation."
!d. "It clt:arly could not have bt:t:n tht: conct:pt of our founding fathers," Sporkin wrote,
"to provide government 'on tht: cheap."' !d. These observations culminated in a paean
to the wisdom and couragt: of the Congress for passing and the Presidt:nt for signing the
1989 Act. Sec id. at 141-42. Judge Sporkin then concluded, without much explanation,
that the argument that the Amendment rt:quires the separate passagt: of each COLA was
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The likelihood that the judiciary would ignore the ERA, or
at least interpret it narrowly, raises a more fundamental question
about efforts to resurrect it: is it really a good idea to ornament
the Constitution with amendments that guarantee "rights" in
high-sounding rhetoric, but that contain little judiciallyenforceable substance? 28 The specter of unenforceability has often been invoked to defeat hortatory amendments whose meaningful enforcement by the judiciary would either prove mischievous or impossible-the balanced budget amendment and the
so-called victims' rights amendment are two recent examples. 29
State constitutions, by contrast, are often replete with such constitutional graffiti, which state courts have deemed aspirational
and thus unenforceable, at least by the judiciary. 30 Too many
such provisions can leave a constitution, in the words of Chief
Justice John Marshall, "a magnificent structure, indeed, to look

"an extremely strained reading of the 27th Amendment-a reading for which the plain
language of the ammdment provides no support." !d. at 142. Judge Sporkin went on to
cite a case from the D.C. Circuit, decided before the ratification of the Amendment,
which rejected a challenge to an act allowing congressional delegation of responsibility
for setting congressional salaries to the President. Sec id. at 142-43 (discussing Humplzrey v. Baker, 848 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). ''The 27th amendment,'' Sporkin wrote,
"does nothing to alter Congress' legitimate delegation of responsibilities to implement a
duly enacted salary structure and adjustment mechanism.'' !d. at 143.
Sporkin's observation merely begs the question whether an amendment obviously
designed to render accountable members of Congress who raise their own pay has anything to say about the ability of Congress to avoid the very accountability the Amendment tries to ensure by delegating that responsibility to the executive branch. There is at
least a plausible argument that it docs. That Judge Sporkin seemed unwilling even to
consider those arguments suggests that he did not take the Twenty-Seventh Amendment
verv scriouslv
· 28. Sec. generally Citizens for the Constitution, "Great and Extraordinary OccasiollS": Developing Guidelines for Coi!Stitutional Change 7, 19-20 (Century Foundation
Press, 1999) ("The addition of purely aspirational statements, designed solely for symbolic effect, would lead interest groups to attempt to write their own special concerns
into the Constitution."); J.B. Ruhl, The Metrics of Constitwional Amendmems: And Why
Proposed Environmental Quality Amendments Don't Measure Up, 74 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 245, 275-77 ( 1999) (cautioning against writing aspirational, symbolic measures into a
constitution); Brannon P. Denning, This Amendment Would be Constitutional Graffiti,
L.A. Times B9 (Feb. 5, 1997) (pointing out problems of enforceability inherent in the
proposed Balanced Budget Amendment). Proponents of ERA's ratification often speak
of its symbolic importance. Sec generally Held, Herndon and Stager, 3 Wm. & Mary J.
Women & L. at 135 (cited in note 7); Baker, 85 A.B.A. J. at 55 (cited in note 7); Editorial, St. Louis Post-Dispatch at B6 (cited in note 7); Scott, K.C. Star at B7 (cited in note
7); Sefton, USA Today at 3A (cited in note 7); Simon, L.A. Times at AS (cited in note 7).
29. For commentary on various symbolic or aspirational amendments, sec Ruhl, 74
Notre Dame L. Rev. at 246 n.S (cited in note 28).
30. For a somewhat dated discussion of such provisions, sec generally Walter F.
Dodd, Judicially Non-Enforceable Provisions of Constitutions, 80 U. Pa. L. Rev. 54
(1931).
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at, but totally unfit for use" 31 -an apt description of some state
constitutions. 32
Finally, those pursuing the Madison Amendment model of
ratification for the ERA do not seem troubled by the effect that
a successful effort would have on the constitutional amending
process. If, as scholars suggest, 33 ratification of the TwentySeventh Amendment was dubious, at best, should we even contemplate compounding error by pressuring Congress to approve
yet another product of such an irregular process? 34 Are proponents of ratification willing to devote the time and energy necessary to resolve all of the legal controversies swirling around the
ERA- validity of rescissions, the constitutionality of the 1979
extension, and the like? What of other proposed amendments
that have lain dormant? Will we have to deal with them soon,
too? And what of the various proposals to call constitutional
conventions of one sort or another? Have enough states called
for a convention at one time or another to meet Article V's requirements?35 If so, must Congress call one? The presence of
these and other serious questions should at least give supporters
pause.
Of course, supporters of the ERA could always reintroduce
the Amendment in Congress, get the required two-thirds vote in
both houses, and then seek ratification by three-fourths of the
states, just as the Constitution requires. We do not know
whether there is sufficient support for the ERA to gain such
constitutional supermajorities or not, but the fact that supporters

31. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I, 222 (1824).
32. See, e.g., G. Alan Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions 143 (Princeton U.
Press, 1998) (noting tendency of twentieth-century "interest groups and factions within
the legislature [toj champion[ I constitutional amendments to enshrine policy decisions in
the fundamental law, hoping thereby to make it more difficult for them to be overturned") (footnote omitted); cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Against Positive Rights, in Andras
Sajo, ed., Western Rights?: Post-Communist Application (Kluwcr Law International,
1996) (warning emerging democracies that the usc of new constitutions to enshrine a
"chaotic catalogue of abstractions" would be "a large mistake, possibly a disaster").
33. See, for example. Paulsen, 103 Yale L.J. at 678-81,722 (cito.:d in note 17); William Van Alstyne, What Do You Think Abollt the Twentv-Seventlz Amendment?, 10
Const. Comm. 9 (1993).
·
34. Again, the haste with which Congress approvo.:d the Madison Amendment, despite questions from legal scholars. is perhaps itself evidence that questions ro.:garding the
amo.:ndment process should not be regardo.:d as nonjusticiable political questions and left
to the discro.:tion of Congress, as some scholars have suggested. Sec, e.g., Tribe, 97 Harv.
L. Rev. (cited in note 14).
35. For a thoughtful discussion of these issues, and a plausible argument that a sufficient number of states have "li\c" petitions for an Article V constitutional convention
before Congress, seo.: Paulsen, 103 Yale L.J. at 733-35 (cited in note 17).
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have resorted to constitutional necromancy in their efforts torevive the ERA suggests that even ERA's backers have their
doubts. If this is the case, then that alone is probably the best
reason not to short circuit the Constitution's demanding
amendment process.

